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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j), and was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is Salt Lake City Corporation entitled to ignore its own mandatory ordinances regarding 
public hearing notices? That is, did the trial court err in holding that Salt Lake City Corporation 
may send out materially misleading hearing notices in violation its own mandatory ordinances, and 
that this violation does not give rise to any actionable claim on the part of citizens such as 
appellant Steven McCowin who was thus deprived of adequate hearing notice? The trial court 
dismissed pursuant to a motion to dismiss, based upon standing and due process arguments; the 
Court of Appeals reviews for correctness without deference to the trial court. Utah County v. 
Ivie. 137 P.2d 797 (Utah 2006); D.A.R. v. State of Utatu 133 P.3d 445 (Utah App. 2006); Cook 
v. Zions First National Bank. 57 P.3d 1084 (Utah 2002). This issue was presented to the district 
court and preserved for appeal. (R. at 2-4,410-15) 
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES 
The following portions of the Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake City are relevant to the 
determination of this appeal: Salt Lake City Ordinance 21 A.04.020.E provides in relevant part 
that, "The word 'shall' is mandatory; the word 'may' is permissive." Salt Lake City Ordinance 
21 A.10.020 provides in relevant part that, 
Providing all of the information necessary for notice of all public hearings 
required under this title shall be the responsibility of the applicant... The 
historic landmark commission shall hold at least one public hearing to review, 
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consider and approve, approve with conditions, or deny an application for a 
certificate of appropriateness for alteration, new construction or demolition of a 
landmark site or contributing structure(s) located in the H historic preservation 
overlay district.... Where a public hearing is required, such hearing shall be 
held after the following public notification:... Notice by first class mail shall be 
provided a minimum of fourteen (14) calendar days in advance of the public 
hearing . . . to all owners of the land... within eighty five feet (85*) for 
certificates of appropriateness for alterations and three hundred feet (300*) for 
certificates of appropriateness for new construction.... The notice for mailing 
for any public hearing required pursuant to subsections A through E of this 
section shall state the substance of the application and the date, time and place of 
the public hearing, and the place where such application may be inspected by the 
public. The notice shall also advise that interested parties may appear at the 
public hearing and be heard with respect to the application. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 27, 2006, plaintiff and appellant Steven E. McCowin ("Mr. McCowin") filed his 
Complaint against defendants and appellees Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City"), Barry 
Rasmussen and Mark Hammond ("Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond") claiming that these 
defendants had violated mandatory City ordinances in the manner in which the City issued its 
authorization for Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond to construct a large, two-story building 
catty-corner from Mr. McCowin5 s home in the University Historic District. (R. at 1-14) In 
particular, Mr. McCowin claimed that the City and Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond had sent 
out a deceptive hearing notice, and that the two-story building is architecturally non-compatible 
with the University Historic District. (R. at 3-4) 
On August 21, 2006, the City filed a Motion to Dismiss (R. at 61-7), seeking dismissal of 
Mr. McCowin's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On August 8, 2006, Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond filed an Answer to the Complaint. 
(R. at 15-24) Subsequently, on September 29, 2006, Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond filed a 
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Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (R. at 359-382), seeking dismissal of 
the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and/or Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The district court dismissed Mr. McCowin's Complaint on November 14, 2006. (R. at 
584-86) 
Mr. McCowin filed his Notice of Appeal on December 6, 2006. (R. at 587-88) 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. This case involves the City's approval for the construction of a large, two-story 
accessory building in the University Historic District. (R. at 1) 
2. In September or October of 2005, the City issued a written notice of a public 
hearing to be held on November 2, 2005 (the "November 2 hearing"). The hearing notice stated 
that the following matter would be considered at the November hearing: 
Case No. 0270-05 at 446 South Douglas Street by Barry Rasmussen and Mark 
Hammond, requesting to construct a new garage with access to the abutting 
alley. This property is located in the University Historic District. 
(Rat 2, 6) 
3. Mr. McCowin alleged that the two-story building proposed by Messrs. 
Rasmussen and Hammond is substantially more than a "garage" as that term is defined in the 
City's Ordinances, and that the hearing notice was therefore deceptive. (R. at 2-3) 
4. Mr. McCowin alleged that this deception prevented him from knowing the 
substance of the proposal that would be discussed at the November 2 hearing, and interfered with 
his right to appear at the hearing and oppose the proposed two-story building. (R. at 3-4). 
5. Mr. McCowin presented evidence to the district court that the City violated other 
of its mandatory ordinances in the manner in which it conducted the November 2 hearing. (R. at 
3 
418-420) 
6. As soon as Mr. McCowin had actual notice of the substance of the two-story 
building, he promptly initiated this law suit. (R. at 4) 
7. Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond refused to allow any discovery regarding the 
non-"garage" nature of their two-story building. (R. at 395) 
8. In its Memorandum Decision dated October 30, 2006, the district court noted that 
it "has serious concerns regarding the adequacy of the 'notice' provided Plaintiff in this case. (R. 
at 551) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The City's mandatory Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 gave Mr. McCowin the right to receive a 
non-deceptive notice of the November 2 hearing. 
Neither of the two cases upon which the district court based its dismissal dealt with the 
violation of a mandatory notice ordinance; neither case supports the district court's judgment that 
Mr. McCowin had no right to a non-deceptive hearing notice notwithstanding Ordinance 
21 A. 10.020. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. McCOWIN HAS ALLEGED A VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT OF 
NOTICE UNDER THE CITY'S MANDATORY NOTICE ORDINANCE 
The City's Ordinance 21A.10.020 mandates that "[pjroviding all of the information 
necessary for notice of the November 2 hearing regarding the proposed two-story building "shall 
be the responsibility of the applicant" - that is, it was the responsibility of Messrs. Rasmussen and 
Hammond. The ordinance further requires that the hearing notice 
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shall be provided . . . to all owners of the land. . . within eighty five feet (85f). 
. . for alterations and three hundred feet (300f) . . . for new construction.... The 
notice for mailing . , . shall state the substance of the application. 
Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 is not discretionary; its notice requirements are imposed with a mandatory 
"shall."1 In Springville Citizens v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25,1fi[29-30, 979 P.2d 332, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a city "is not entitled to disregard its mandatory ordinances," and 
that "the substantial compliance doctrine" does not apply to "expressly mandatory" ordinances. 
Mr. McCowin alleged in his Complaint that the City and Messrs. Rasmussen and 
Hammond violated Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 by failing to disclose the "substance" of the proposed 
two-story building, and instead sending out a materially deceptive hearing notice. (R. at 2-4)2 
This deceptive notice violated not only Ordinance 21 A. 10.020, but also the fundamental purpose 
of a hearing notice - to " adequately inform[] the parties of the specific issues they must prepare 
to meet." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Gibbs. 500 
P.2d 209, 215 (Idaho 1972)).3 There is authority from other jurisdictions supporting an argument 
that the City's failure to "comply with the statutory notice requirement deprived it of jurisdiction 
1See Salt Lake City Ordinance 21A.04.020.E: "The word 'shall' is mandatory; the word 
'may' is permissive." 
2The hearing notice stated that only a "garage" was proposed. (R. at 6) Mr. McCowin 
alleged that the two-story building proposed by Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond was in fact 
substantially more than a "garage" as that term is defined by Ordinance 21 A.62.040. (R. at 2-4) 
Mr. McCowin also presented evidence that Messrs. Rasmussen and Hammond had refused to 
allow discovery regarding the non-"garage" character of their building. (R. at 395) 
3See also Grindstone Butte Mut. Canal v. Idaho Power Co., 574 P.2d 902, 907 (Idaho 
1978) ("Notice is rightfully considered to be a critical aspect of due process to be afforded in any 
administrative process Appurtenant to the right to notice is the right to be fairly notified as to 
the issues to be considered."); Drum v. Fresno County Dept. Public Works, 192 Cal. Rptr. 782, 
786 (App. 1983) ("Wholly inaccurate notice is no notice at all."). 
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and rendered invalid its decision to" approve the two-story building. Walkingstick v. Bd. of 
Adjustment of Tulsa. 706 P.2d 899, 903 (Okl. 1985).4 
The trial court noted that the evidence raised "serious concerns regarding the adequacy 
of the 'notice' provided" in this case (R. at 550-51), but never decided whether, as a matter of 
fact, the notice was sufficiently deceptive to violate Ordinance 21A.10.020. Instead, the court 
held that "prior to reaching this issue, the Court must determine that [Mr. McCowin] had a 
protectable property right for purposes of constitutional due process." (R. at 551) The court then 
held that because the City had some degree of discretion in whether to approve the two-story 
building, Mr. McCowin had no protectable property interest in the outcome of the November 2 
hearing, and therefore no right to receive a non-deceptive notice of that hearing. (R. at 551-52) 
The trial court erred by ignoring Ordinance 21 A. 10.020, which granted a right of notice 
to all adjacent property owners regardless of whether their "protectable property right[s]" were at 
stake in the hearing. It is true, of course, that if the November 2 hearing involved a taking of 
property from Mr. McCowin, then even without Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 he would have had a 
constitutional due process right to a non-deceptive hearing notice.5 However, as this Court held 
4See also 8 A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §25.261, at 388-89 
(3rd ed. 2003) ("Indeed, notice complying with statutory and ordinance requirements may be 
jurisdictional, so that a hearing and decision by a zoning board without timely and proper notice 
are void and of no effect."); 4 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson's American Law of Zoning § 22.17, 
at 48049 (4th ed. 1996) ("The requirement that board action be preceded by notice and hearing is 
jurisdictional The requirement of notice is satisfied only if the notice affords to parties and 
other interested persons an adequate opportunity to prepare as well as to attend.... Where notice 
to certain property owners is required by law, failure to give timely notice to such owners 
invalidates the action of the board."). 
sHansenv.Evre, 2005 UT 29, f 10,116 P.2d 290 ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property 
without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV. In order for this guarantee to be 
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in West Valley City v. Roberts. 1999 UT App 358, |8 , 993 P.2d 252, 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution guarantee due 
process of law in governmental actions in which life, liberty, or property may be 
at risk. However, we need not reach this constitutional level of analysis here 
because procedural due process is guaranteed to the appellants by the 
[municipality's] City Code. 
Unlike the constitutional rights under the due process clause, the right to a hearing notice 
mandated by Ordinance 21 A.10.020 did not depend upon the existence of any protectable 
property right. Therefore, regardless of whether Mr. McCowin "had a protectable property right 
for purposes of constitutional due process" (R. at 551), the trial court erred in holding that as a 
matter of law Ordinance 21 A.10.020 did not give Mr. McCowin any right to a non-deceptive 
hearing notice.6 
implicated, however, a petitioner must raise a claim to some viable liberty or property interest of 
which he is being deprived."); Nelson v. Jacobsen 669 P.2d 1207,1213 (Utah 1983) ("To satisfy 
an essential requisite of procedural due process, a 'hearing' must be prefaced by timely notice 
which adequately informs the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet.") quoting 
State v.Gibbs. 500 P.2d 209 (Idaho 1972). 
^he trial court's holding is also inconsistent with the holding of the Utah Supreme Court 
in Morris v. Public Service Commission. 321 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1958), that "it is axiomatic 
that the order of an administrative body issued without notice to affected individuals is violative of 
due process." See also Travlor Bros., Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. Overton, 736 P.2d 1048,1050 (Utah 
App. 1987) ("orders of administrative agencies issued without notice to affected individuals 
violate due process"). These holdings suggest that under Utah law the due process right to notice 
of an administrative hearing does not depend upon the existence of a "property" interest, but is 
extended to any "affected" person. 
The trial court also ignored the substantial legal constraints on the City's discretion to 
approve the two-story building. Ordinance 21 A.34.020H.H. 1 mandates that the City "shall" only 
approve buildings that meet certain explicit criteria of architectural compatibility within the 
University Historic District. Mr. McCowin alleged that the two-story building violated this 
architectural compatibility constraint. (R. at 3) Mr. McCowin submits that he had more than a 
'"unilateral expectation," Patterson v. American Fork City. 2003 UT 7 f23, 67 P.3d 466, that the 
City would comply with these mandatory ordinances. 
For purposes of this appeal, however, there does not presently seem to be a need to 
address either of these issues. All that is required is the enforcement of the mandatory terms of 
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II. THE CASE LAW RELIED ON BY THE TRIAL COURT IS 
INAPPOSITE 
On page 5 of its Memorandum Decision (R. at 551), the district court cited Patterson v. 
American Fork City, 2003 UT 7,67 P.3d 466, a case in which real estate developers claimed that 
a city's unfavorable zoning decision had deprived them of "substantive due process." The Utah 
Supreme Court held that, 
To state a cognizable substantive due process claim, [plaintifls] must first allege 
sufficient facts to show a property or liberty interest warranting due process 
protection. 
2003 UT 7, f23, quoting Crider v. Bd. of County Comm'rs. 246 R3d 1285,1289 (10th Cir. 
2001). The Patterson court held that the developers' "unilateral expectation" of a favorable 
zoning decision was not a property interest protected by substantive due process. 2003 UT 7, 
ffiI24^27. 
Because Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 creates a right to a non-deceptive hearing notice 
independently of constitutional due process, Patterson is inapposite. As discussed above, 
Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 mandated notice to adjacent property owners whether or not they had a 
constitutionally protected property interest at stake in the hearing. 
On pages 5 and 6 of its Memorandum Decision (R. at 551-52) the district court quoted 
from Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 1994), a case in which homeowners 
claimed that a municipality failed to give them notice of a zoning proceeding regarding an 
adjacent industrial facility, and that this lack of notice amounted to a denial of procedural due 
process. At first blush, Gagliardi seems on point. However, in Gagliardi there is no mention of a 
Ordinance 21A.10.020. 
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municipal notice ordinance- The homeowners in Gagliardi apparently attempted to imply a right 
of notice from constitutional due process principles - arguing that they had a property interest in 
the municipality's enforcement of its zoning code against the adjacent industrial facility, that this 
property interest merited due process protection, and that due process required a hearing notice. 
18 F.3d at 193. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this 
argument, holding that the landowner had no property interest in the enforcement of the zoning 
code, and 
Since the [homeowners] lack a property interest in the enforcement of the 
[municipality's] zoning laws, they are unable to state an actionable claim for 
deprivation of procedural due process. 
18 F.3d at 193. As argued above, Mr. McCowin need not leverage a right to notice from 
constitutional due process principles; he asks only that the mandatory notice requirement of 
Ordinance 21 A. 10.020 be enforced. Gagliardi is therefore inapposite.7 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, appellant Steven McCowin respectfully asks that the 
judgment of the district court be reversed, and that this matter be remanded so that the parties can 
complete discovery regarding disputed matters of fact. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2007. 
Iteven E. McCowin, pro se 
7Moreover, the plaintiffs in Gagliardi were bound by New York law, and did not have the 
benefit of the axiom of Utah law recognized in Morris, 321 P.2d at 646, "that the order of an 
administrative body issued without notice to affected individuals is violative of due process." 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN MCCOWIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION; 
BARRY RASMUSSEN; MARK HAMMOND, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 060912420 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
October 25, 2006 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Salt Lake City Corporations' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, and 
Plaintiff's Motion to Advance and Consolidate Trial on Merits 
with Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The Court 
heard oral argument with respect to the motions on October 23, 
2006. Following the hearing, the matters were taken under 
advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, and 
where applicable, the exhibits attached thereto, hereby enters 
the following ruling. 
This matter comes before the Court the result of the 
building of a two story structure located at 44 6 South Douglas 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
With its motion, Salt Lake City Corporation ("the City") 
argues Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because it is 
MCCOWIN v. SALT LAKE CITY MEMORANDUM DECISION 
untimely, coming more than 3 0 days after the meeting or action 
for which the notice was given. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-209. 
Moreover, contends the City, Plaintiff in this case did not file 
any appeal with the City Land Use Appeals Board and as such, has 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Finally, asserts 
the City, Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed as he has 
admits receiving notice of a proposal to construct a garage on 
the neighboring property and has failed to demonstrate any 
deficiency in that notice. 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing the City had an 
obligation to provide notice of the "substance" of the building 
and in this case, the hearing notice falsely represented that the 
proposed building was a "garage." According to Plaintiff, he 
relied upon the City's representation what only a "garage" was 
proposed when, in fact, it was a two-story building that would be 
the final product. Indeed, asserts Plaintiff, it was because of 
this representation that he did not attend the hearing. As a 
matter of law, contends Plaintiff, the hearing notice's use of 
the word "garage" failed to give adequate notice of the substance 
of the proposed building. 
In light of the facts of this case, it is Plaintiff's 
position an exception to the requirement that administrative 
Page 2 
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remedies be exhausted should be instituted and the equitable 
discovery rule should be enforced to toll the limitations period. 
Defendants Barry Rasmussen and Mark Hammond join in the 
arguments posed by the City with respect to dismissal of this 
matter. Specifically, argue Defendants, Plaintiff has no 
protectable property interest, the notice was adequate, and the 
Commission complied with City ordinances. 
Alternatively, Defendants contend summary judgment is 
appropriate as Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations (which provide that any person adversely 
affected by a final land use decision has thirty days within 
which to file a petition for review in district court or such 
petition is barred). See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-(2) &(6)). 
Moreover, argue Defendants, regardless of whether the Commission 
violated any ordinance, the undisputed record demonstrates the 
Commission's decision would have been the same, hence, Plaintiff 
has suffered no prejudice. Finally, assert Defendants, Plaintiff 
is not entitled to a permanent injunction as a matter of law 
because he cannot establish special damages. Indeed, argue 
Defendants, any damages suffered by Plaintiff are shared by every 
landowner who lives in the University Historic District. 
Plaintiff in opposition argues Defendants' motion for 
Page 3 
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summary judgment is premature. Moreover, contends Plaintiff, 
the two-story building's incompatibility with and injury to the 
University Historic District is, at the very least, a disputed 
issue. Additionally, asserts Plaintiff, he was entitled to a 
hearing notice accurately disclosing the substance of Defendants' 
proposed building. Indeed, argues Plaintiff, the City's 
ordinances mandate such a notice and this mandate was violated by 
the misleading notice that was sent. Further, contends 
Plaintiff, Defendants have repeatedly initiated and threatened to 
initiate, legal proceedings against conditions they dislike on 
their neighbors' property. 
It is Plaintiff's position Defendants' two-story building is 
not a garage, the Notice was legally deficient and, the City 
violated a number of its ordinances. 
Further, argues Plaintiff, as argued above, the equitable 
discovery rule tolls the limitations period. 
Finally, Plaintiff contends he has suffered special damages 
over and above those suffered by the District generally. Indeed, 
argues Plaintiff, because of the proximity of the building to his 
property, it intrudes into his light and air in a way not shared 
by the general public. 
After reviewing the record in this matter and although the 
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Court has some serious concerns regarding the adequacy of the 
"notice" provided Plaintiff in this case, prior to reaching this 
issue, the Court must determine that Plaintiff had a protectable 
property right for purposes of constitutional due process. 
For his part, Plaintiff asserts the City's ordinances and/or 
the public hearing requirement create such a right and give him 
something in the nature of a property interest. This said, 
however, a legitimate claim of entitlement requires explicit 
rules creating the right and, if a city has discretion in 
applying the rules, there is no legitimate.claim of entitlement. 
See Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 473 (Utah 
2003) . Indeed, in Gagliardi v. Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188 
(2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit elaborated stating: 
Where a local regulator has discretion with 
regard to the benefit at issue, there 
normally is no entitlement to that benefit. 
An entitlement to a benefit arises "only when 
the discretion of the issuing agency is so 
narrowly circumscribed" as to virtually 
assure conferral of the benefit. The issue 
of whether an individual has such a property 
interest is a question of law "since the 
entitlement analysis focuses on the degree of 
official discretion and not on the 
probability of its favorable exercise." 
Id. at 192. (Internal citations omitted). 
While Plaintiff has cited several ordinances, he has pointed 
to nothing in those ordinances which purports to limit the City's 
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discretion in approving new structures in the University Historic 
District. Furthermore, the "deprivation of a procedural right to 
be heard . . . is not actionable when there is no protected right 
at stake." Id, at 193. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court finds Plaintiff's 
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. In light of this 
xuling, the Court denes not reach Plaintiffs Motion to Advance 
and Consolidate Trial on Merits with Hearing on Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. 
DATED this day of October, 2006. 
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